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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores and contrasts the different social processes of valuation now 
appearing as economic means of valuing the environment.  Monetary valuation via 
stated preference approaches has been criticised for assuming well formed and 
informed preferences and excluding a range of sustainability concerns such as 
rights, fairness and equity.  Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) in small groups is 
a novel hybrid of economic and political approaches which raises the prospect of a 
transformative and moralising experience.  Critics of standard contingent valuation 
approaches have advocated this as offering a way forward.  However there has been 
a lack of clarity as to the means of obtaining values, the expected outcomes and 
their role.  Moving to group settings of deliberation raises concepts of social 
willingness to pay and accept which are distinct from an aggregate of individual 
value, although this does not seem to have been widely recognised.  A new 
classification of values is presented appropriate to the literature trying to merge 
economic and political processes.  Values associated with the individual may be 
exchange values, charitable contributions or fair prices, while social values can be 
speculative, expressive or arbitrated.  The use of DMV is shown to result in different 
values due to variations in the institutional setting and process of valuation. 
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C. L. Spash 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic valuation of the environment by extending a market based theory has run 
into a series of critiques and problems.  Stated preference methods are heavily 
employed in the type of value transfer work informing ecosystem valuation and green 
accounting.  Yet, primary studies have been the subject of considerable controversy 
within economics (e.g., Hausman, 1993; Knetsch, 1994; Gowdy, 2004; Vatn, 2004; 
Knetsch, 2005) as well as on grounds of their political characteristics (Sagoff, 
1988a), inherently narrow philosophy of value (O'Neill, 1993; Spash, 2000b; Aldred, 
2006), and poor representation of human psychology (Kahneman, Ritov and 
Schkade, 1999; Kahneman and Sugden, 2005; Spash, 2006).  Value transfer 
methods are themselves, independently of the primary studies, subjects of serious 
criticism in terms of their reliability, accuracy, theoretical consistency and validity 
(Spash and Vatn, 2006). 
Such concerns have led to calls for and exploration of alternative approaches 
(Martinez-Alier, Munda and O'Neill, 1998; Spash, Stagl and Getzner, 2005; Spash 
and Vatn, 2006; Stagl, 2007).  Emphasis has been placed on quality in the social 
process of valuation (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; O'Connor et al., 1998).  
Participatory, inclusive and deliberative fora have been seen as a direct way of 
avoiding environmental cost-benefit analysis (CBA) while aiding management 
decisions and policy design with the hope of broadening democracy (Spash, 2001a).  
This is not to deny that political alternatives have their own problems.  They are 
advocated as open processes, which encourage discussion and argumentation, 
often explicitly involving vested interests, and as a result the outcomes are far from 
certain.  The openness of outcomes is seen by many as an advantage in terms of 
developing lateral thinking, but may be regarded as a disadvantage within 
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organisations whose aim is to close down decisions, choose options or validate pre-
existing positions.  One way forward now being offered as “the best of both worlds” is 
to combine CBA with participatory methods as deliberative monetary valuation 
(DMV).  That is the use of formal deliberation concerning an environmental impact to 
express value in monetary terms for policy purposes, and more specifically as an 
input to CBA (Spash, 2001b).  A range of papers have recently appeared on this 
topic (e.g., Gregory and Wellman, 2001; Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; Spash, 2001b; 
Macmillan et al., 2002; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Aldred, 2005; James and Blamey, 
2005; Howarth and Wilson, 2006; Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006; Lienhoop 
and MacMillan, 2007) adding to earlier research (Brown, Peterson and Tonn, 1995; 
Blamey, 1996; Holland, 1997; Jacobs, 1997; O'Neill and Spash, 1998; Sagoff, 1998; 
Blamey and James, 1999; Ward, 1999). 
In the following sections I will show how environmental economics 
approaches environmental problems as an extension of market theory and compare 
this with the approach of the political sciences to social valuation.  Using this base 
understanding of different social processes of valuation I then look at what is being 
proposed under DMV.  Thus, I wish to bring to the fore the connections, or failures to 
connect, between research within the areas of socio-economics and political science 
as applied to environmental values and their understanding.  A classification is 
offered which contrast the role of individuals versus groups in the process of 
valuation and differentiates between individual and social values as products of any 
such process.  The result is to clarify a range of approaches and types of value (from 
charitable contribution to arbitrated social value) now emerging from DMV, while 
exposing numerous problems. 
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SOCIAL PROCESSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION 
This section summarises what I see as key aspects of two models: the mainstream 
economic model of valuation and the democratic political model of human conduct.  
This allows some characteristics of the route by which choice is made under the 
different processes to be identified along with the divergence and similarities in 
economic and political values.  In doing so I refer to institutions by which I mean the 
conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society.  This follows Vatn 
(2005: 60) who also notes that: “Institutions regularize life, support values and 
produce and protect interests.”.  Thus, we should expect different institutions to 
support, produce and protect different things.  I sketch some of the problems 
confronting economic and political approaches in order to see, later on, how far DMV 
is able to address such issues; this also exposes what advocates of each social 
process are pleading for and trying to defend. 
The Economic Process of Valuation 
The standard neoclassical economic approach to valuing the surrounding world is 
couched within a microeconomic model of institutional structure.  In this setting the 
key unit of analytical concern is the individual.  Contrary to many positivistic claims, 
economics does have an underlying ethical philosophy and that is one where ‘good’ 
is defined by the consequences of an action as they benefit the individual (Sen, 
1987; Anderson, 1993; O'Neill, 1998; Spash, 2002).  Social welfare is merely an 
aggregation of individual welfare.  The individual is assumed to make choices via 
expression of preferences.  The happiness, or utility, of an individual is dependent 
upon their ability to trade to their best advantage.  In a standard market setting 
individuals engage in selling their labour and buying consumer items and their only 
limit on obtaining happiness is their ability to pay.  A process of negotiation or 
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arbitrage in exchange allows some reasoning over appropriate actions and 
opportunities for learning, although traditionally static economic models ignore this 
more dynamic aspect. 
Institutions defining the rules of engagement have been the subject of 
research in game theory and experimental economics (Smith, 1991; Kagel and Roth, 
1995; Gintis, 2000).  Statements as to what an individual is prepared to give up or 
accept in an exchange situation are regarded as expression of an underlying 
preference.  Once an exchange is finalised the price is set and the value in 
exchange can be observed.  In practice the outcome will depend upon the specifics 
of market structure, cultural practices and customs.  For example, posted prices may 
be regarded as non-negotiable, or prices may be a starter for haggling, or auctions 
may be held and such auctions may vary considerably in their design (means of 
bidding, eligibility, number of iterations, accepted behaviour).  This structure is the 
institutional setting within which exchange operates and in microeconomics is 
idealised as perfectly competitive (i.e. many competing buyers and sellers so none 
has power over prices).  The social process of economic valuation as described here 
is summarised in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Environmental valuation under CBA borrows directly from the idealised 
market process (Vatn, 2000).  Individuals are expected to be able and willing to 
express a preference over any environmental change.  These preferences are 
generally regarded as existing a priori.  A CVM survey or choice experiment aims to 
obtain a stated preference, while observations of actual markets can be used to infer 
or reveal preferences, as under hedonic pricing or the travel cost method.  Value is 
given to an object, service or entity on the basis of what will be exchanged in return.  
4 
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Those entities or objects that are regarded as reasonable for entering into the 
institution of exchange are culturally and historically highly variable.  The expansion 
of environmental valuation, and market institutions for such things as carbon, can be 
seen as setting new precedents for what humans (or at least some of them) are 
prepared to treat as items for exchange.  Such expansion, beyond the confines of 
traditional and established commodity markets, has also led to a range of revelations 
as to problems with the economic approach as a universal theory of social valuation 
(e.g. O'Neill, 1993; Spash, 2000b; Soma, 2006; Trainor, 2006). 
The Political Process of Valuation 
The social process which is political valuation is summarised in Figure 2.  The main 
unit of concern in political structures can be characterised as social groupings.  
Thus, for example, concern over social justice emphasises disparities between social 
classes, casts, ethnic groups, genders and so on.  Power is obtained through 
membership and representation of a social group.  Individuals can identify with a 
given group by conforming to the expectations of other group members so 
expressing a communitarian view and shared set of values.  Such values may be 
described as social norms, and social psychologists have developed the term 
subjective norm for the extent to which an individual conforms to what they believe 
others will think of their actions. 
Institutions appear more evident and diverse in the political realm than the 
economic.  Politics is all about the interplay of pluralistic values within a social 
setting.  In an idealised democratic setting that interplay takes place via open 
deliberation, between individuals and social groups, without coercion.  Political 
debate should aid the formation of an opinion over any given issue enabling the 
casting of a vote.  Given the socially charged nature of power politics, openly stated 
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intentions to vote can be expected to diverge from privately submitted anonymous 
ballots.  Different designs of political process will also affect the outcome.  Indeed 
national elections in supposedly well established democracies continue to be highly 
controversial due to the perceived biases within the systems employed.  Political 
institutions tend to advocate first past the post systems at national level and 
consensus seeking at local or small group level. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Voting is a means of aggregating individual preferences that are (by 
assumption) defined by ordinal rankings.  Basically the most valued outcome is the 
highest ranked e.g. the option gaining the most votes in a first past the post system.  
How much more valuable the first outcome is relative to the second is not then 
judged.  This means a tendency towards all or nothing solutions; either your 
candidate is elected or you lose.  One counter to this is to design processes for 
consensus seeking.  However, while consensus has its role to play, the emphasis on 
consensus politics can also be heavily overplayed and a “consensus” approach may 
be used to silence minority opinions rather than empower.  Consensus can be 
achieved more easily where issues are generalised, but once specific plans of action 
and detail arise divisions tend to appear.  In this regard, “win-win” solutions are 
popular rhetorical devices which often lack credibility because the barriers to their 
achievement are hidden or the potential side effects downplayed.  There are often 
historically embedded institutions, reflected in power structures, preventing “win-win” 
outcomes.  Of course small group consultation, as advocated for addressing 
environmental issues, need not be restricted to consensus or majority opinions, and 
the concepts are of dissenting and minority reports is important for allowing 
expression of a broader range of concerns which arise during a political process 
6 
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(Ward, 1999).  This may also expose powerful majority interest from the 
disenfranchised minority ones.  Thus, seeking to explain, explore and respect (not 
remove) “dissensus” might be just as valuable in some contexts as aiming for 
consensus can be in others. 
In the environmental arena a range of approaches have been designed and 
employed to increase participation and deliberation.  These are normally described 
as ranging from consultation as an information gathering exercise through to full 
engagement with decision making powers where citizens take control (Arnstein, 
1969).  The former is very common and, for example, UK government documents 
have been increasingly posted on the internet for comment.  The latter is very 
uncommon because this requires that authority be effectively handed over by those 
who have been elected or delegated to take responsibility.  Face to face 
engagement with individuals and groups is of primary concern for addressing 
perceived failings in existing political processes.  Such engagement at regional or 
national level is rare and this is in part due to issues of representation and 
responsibility, to which I return below.  However there have been attempts to 
broaden democratic debate and the GM Nation (http://www.gmnation.org.uk/) 
exercise in the UK is an interesting example employing multiple local discussions on 
a national issue with the aim of reflecting upon national policy. 
More commonly deliberative fora are local and tend to select either 
representatives of specific power groups or members of the public.  The former are 
referred to as stakeholder consultation.  The stakeholder is by definition a party with 
a vested interest in the topic at hand and representatives are chosen on the basis of 
their standing as representatives of a recognised social group (e.g. farmers, single 
mothers, local business people).  The relevant social groupings for inclusion will vary 
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with the context and problem.  Stakeholders can be difficult to engage in a process 
of deliberation (Arzt, 2005), and especially where they have prior expectations from 
existing institutions and/or power within existing decision processes which they wish 
to protect.  In reviewing US experience with stakeholder engagement Beierle and 
Konisky (2001) identify benefits as better incorporation of public knowledge and 
values, resolving conflict and building trust, and improved understanding of 
environmental problems, but they also note a lack of impact on plan implementation 
and occurrences of important interests being ignored. 
The more public orientated and inclusive small group approaches look for 
diversity rather than vested interests.  The small group (10-25 people) has become a 
respected method for investigating environmental conflict, values and interest, 
whereas twenty years ago it was not even regarded as an established research 
approach (Burgess, Limb and Harrison, 1988b; Burgess, Limb and Harrison, 1988a).  
Small group approaches have several variants and names: consensus conferences 
as developed by the Danish Board of Technology (Joss, 1998), focus groups 
(Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990), and citizens’ juries (Crosby, 1995).  Methods 
which may be employed in combination with stakeholder and small group 
approaches include scenario analysis, social multi-criteria analysis and mediated 
modelling (Kallis et al., 2006; Stagl, 2007). 
Political scientists have been empowered by the increasing adoption of their 
suggestions.  There has been some realisation in government that public 
participation in policy is an important aspect of democracy and might be especially 
effective at the local/regional level.  However, participation is far from straight 
forward itself.  One concern is for the process being manipulated through systematic 
distortion of communication.  However, recognising that manipulation is a present 
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and on-going state of affairs in modern society implies a need for processes which 
remove such distortion allowing people to break free and apply some corrective 
reflection (Niemeyer, 2005: 348).  Such concerns have driven research on, and 
analysis of, the best approaches by which social values can be integrated in policy 
processes (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Renn, Webler and Wiedemann, 1995). 
Ideal approaches are then described as involving the interplay of technical 
analysis and social deliberation based upon values, interests and policy options.  
Such participatory processes do not aim to exclude a role for utilitarian calculations.  
These can provide an opportunity for explicit consideration of practical reasons for 
positions.  They may be recommended at definition and agenda-setting stages as 
well being available throughout a given process of deliberation.  However, reliance 
purely upon practical reason justified by utilitarian calculations is recognised as an 
inadequate means of including individual rights which may therefore be violated.  For 
example the interests of disenfranchised participants may be poorly addressed even 
when their own evaluations of a process are positive, say because they were so 
happy with actually being consulted for once.  Conceptions of both right and good 
are then deemed necessary (Pelletier et al., 1999: 122). 
Initial Comparison of Political and Economic Processes 
A common appeal of the deliberative approach is the belief that it is necessary to 
allow preference construction and that it can be a transformative experience.  The 
first claim can be seen as paralleling attacks upon the standard economic position.  
In light of sustained criticism and empirical evidence the assumptions that 
preferences are pre-existing, stable, and complete across all choice sets, and can 
therefore merely be called upon, no longer seem tenable.  If economists take this 
seriously then the process by which preferences are formed must be analysed.  This 
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is a similar issue for political scientist because of the claims made for deliberative 
processes as leading to better outcomes.  Thus, measures of motivation such as 
attitudes can be seen as important to understanding the outcomes of both stated 
preference methods (Spash, 2006) and small group deliberation (Niemeyer, 2005).  
In the latter case the second claim is relevant because the expectation from political 
theory is that deliberation will allow individuals to look beyond immediate self-interest 
and toward the common good (Niemeyer, 2004).  This has also been extended to a 
moralising effect which can enfranchise Nature and allow representation of others 
(including non-humans).  Representation of silent voices such as non-humans and 
future generations remains a problematic issue in all processes of environmental 
valuation (O'Neill, 2001). 
In general representation of any group relies upon institutional arrangements 
e.g. election of Union officials, nomination of non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
spokespersons.  In the case of silent voices they are unable to play a role in the 
institution or to affirm or criticise their designated representative.  O’Neill (2001) 
refers to this as absence of authorisation, accountability and presence.  Still there 
seems a legitimate case for arguing that those engaged in understanding a groups’ 
needs can represent those needs e.g. as in the cases of child welfare or the mentally 
disabled.  Here reliance is upon legitimacy to speak for silent voices due to the 
knowledge, expertise or judgment of the representative and their reflection of this in 
caring for the interests and aspirations of the silent ones (O'Neill, 2001).  Often 
NGOs are delegated to represent nature and/or future generations, although this 
does not exclude representation via citizens and especially so if the transformative 
element of deliberation is indeed operative.  Of course who specifically acts as 
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representative of what remains problematic (e.g. which NGO, which person from that 
NGO, which citizens and why). 
In national democratic elections there are fairly simple rules of participation as 
the aim is to be all inclusive, i.e. the whole of the body politic is meant to be 
represented in person.  In small group participation selection can become far more 
controversial, especially where the group has decision-making authority as opposed 
to being merely consulted for an opinion.  Within a social group there may be 
numerous division and value positions so that the selection of a representative is far 
from easy.  Small groups which are seen as making decisions for a much larger 
population can suffer lack of legitimisation.  A related criticism is that 
recommendations from unelected small groups lack clear lines of responsibility for 
the outcomes.  These are issues which economists try to avoid via appealing to 
statistical representation, e.g. idealised as selecting a random sample from a given 
population, which concentrates upon empirical and explanatory issues.  Such a 
random selection is actually extremely difficult and expensive to obtain, and so 
sampling is often quota or even ad hoc.  In fact the economic approach tends to 
ignore normative problems concerning the legitimacy of democratic representation 
which remain present but implicit. 
A different type of exclusiveness relates to the actual process and its 
implementation.  Procedural rules and process are important areas of debate.  The 
general aim of political small group processes is for participatory inclusive 
deliberation.  Yet, any social process of valuation can lead to exclusion.  Economic 
valuation is criticised because WTP leads to exclusion on the basis of income.  While 
the concept of “willingness to say” has been raised as leading to exclusion on the 
basis of poor education and inability to articulate an argument.  However, exclusion 
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is dealt with more explicitly by political processes, and confidence and trust in the 
structure and conduct of the process are recognised as highly important features.  
Thus, dominance by one interest is to be avoided and silent parties are to be 
encouraged to have their say.  This can be particularly problematic where there are 
cultural differences and historically excluded minority groups e.g. Australian 
aboriginal groups (Rockloff and Lockie, 2006). 
Popularity of consultative exercises in order to gain public “buy-in” and 
increase credibility can also lead to participant “burn-out”, e.g. Gregory and Wellman 
(2001: 41) note their study as being the 75th major consultation exercise in the 
county within a 10 year period.  Where responsible agencies fail to follow through on 
the recommendations of consultation future attempts to consult will likely prove 
unpopular and levels of distrust will be increased.  Well structured and competently 
conducted deliberative processes can be costly exercises which participants find 
challenging.  At the same time the outcomes are more uncertain than from the 
instrumental economic process which has a single number as its goal.  Clearly 
agencies and politicians may dislike the recommendations they get from a group 
whereas a price which is too high or too low can more easily be adjusted (in private), 
subject to sensitivity analysis (using expert manipulation), dismissed (via judicious 
use of alternative expert opinion), or if necessary recalculated (hiring another 
consultant and informing them of the “failures” of the last study).  Once people have 
been engaged in a process of deliberation and been empowered as part of a 
decision process their presence and opinion is less easily dismissed. 
ADVOCATES OF DMV AS A THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT 
The preceding section has outlined the basic models of economic and political 
process being applied to environmental problems.  How the DMV approach has 
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been advocated as entering into this picture is explored here.  A variety of different 
potential outcomes can then be identified. 
Sagoff (1988a; 1988b) established himself in the environmental valuation field 
with attacks upon environmental economics in general and the CVM in particular.  
However, he has written suggesting that there is hope for the CVM if it can 
incorporate (or be incorporated into?) a deliberative process (Sagoff, 1998).  In 
particular he states that the CVM must become “a deliberative, discursive, jury-like 
research method emphasizing informed discussion leading toward a consensus 
based on argument about the public interest” (Sagoff, 1998: 213).  His 
recommendation of consensus seeking seems rather counter to his recognition that 
“individuals may state logically opposing views of social policy” (Sagoff, 1998: 214) 
and that debate about environmental policy will reflect such views which 
differentiates it from the realm of economic decisions. 
Sagoff has also argued a particularly dogmatic view putting forth a dichotomy 
of human affairs between the political citizen and the economic consumer: 
“consumer preferences reflect conceptions of the good life individuals seek for 
themselves, while citizen preferences reflect conceptions of the good society offered 
for the consideration and agreement of others.” (Sagoff, 1998: 215).  The problem 
with this reasoning is that markets cannot be so easily separated from politics and 
are indeed framed by the a priori setting of institutions defined by conceptions of the 
good society.  Sagoff (1998) notes there are traditions which identify political rather 
than market institutions or processes as appropriate to making decisions with 
respect to environmental goods of moral, aesthetic and cultural significance.  
However, these traditions are culturally defined and change over time.  Thus the 
boundaries of the market can be observed to have changed (e.g. with respect to 
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child labour, slavery, endangered species).  The point is that different values may be 
simultaneously associated with an environmental entity and imply different motives 
to action.  Certainly these differences may be reflected in different realms of human 
action (e.g. the economic and political) but there are no clear lines here.  Indeed 
there are whole realms of political action which can be clearly identified as being 
expressed in the market place.  The act of purchase can be a political one with 
examples from preference for fair trade and organic products to boycotts of products 
from countries or companies deemed to have behaved badly in one way or another. 
Sagoff (1998: 217) notes that people’s moral commitments can conflict with 
their welfare maximizing behaviour.  However, that people hold different motives for 
valuation does not so clearly lead to a division between citizen and consumer, 
political and economic.  This is important because Sagoff recognises and cites 
literature on the all pervasive nature of environmental problems.  Those 
environmental problems he has argued are the domain of “values individuals 
typically pursue through civic and political association, not through actual or 
hypothetical market transactions” (Sagoff, 1998: 218).  This means all goods and 
services are in the realm of political action, although Sagoff does not make this point 
and seems to want to preserve some realm for free markets to operate unfettered, 
while he leaves the market space and its boundaries undefined.  On this point he 
does state that socialization requires learning “to enjoy what is valuable rather than 
to value what is enjoyable” (Sagoff, 1998: 219).  Which seems to signify that all 
choices, even in the market place, have a moral aspect. 
Initially Sagoff recommends that WTP be restricted to rank or measure 
preferences relative to one another which is unsurprising as this restricts 
measurement to that of a political process.  As Sagoff (1998: 220) notes, this means 
14 
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the distinction between consumer and citizen preferences loses its significance.  
However, he fails to address the question: “so why bother with WTP at all?”  Indeed 
this point has been made by Kahneman et al. (1993: 314) who argue that, if the only 
objective of measurement is to rank-order issues, WTP is “not the preferred way of 
doing so because it is psychometrically inferior to other measures of the same 
attitude”.  Others might regard it as politically inferior. 
Indeed in order to promote the DMV approach Sagoff does some back 
tracking and rather confusingly (at various points) recommends three different 
potential monetary measures as goals.  First is a social WTP which is an individual’s 
opinion of how much society should pay for, or more accurately invest in, a given 
public good or service.  This is basically a decision on how to divide-up a given 
social budget.  Second is a group “value or price” arising from deliberation by a 
citizen’s jury.  Presumably recognising the problems of representation posed by one 
small group deciding a price he recommends several such juries be run to achieve a 
consensus (he makes no comment on how this is to be achieved or what happens if 
they do not).  This second approach appears at odds with the argument for 
restricting outcomes to an ordinal ranking on the grounds that preferences are not to 
be treated as a measure of subjective well-being.  There is no clarity in describing 
the further use of this price, which might appear akin to price fixing by the likes of a 
milk marketing board.  The relationship of this non-market good price to those 
derived under current CBA practice is also unclear, but given Sagoff’s critical writings 
he presumably believes there is a difference.  Third is individual WTP as a 
contribution or fair share rather than a measure of welfare.  This has some credibility 
because the CVM has been noted to produce a payment which has more in common 
with a charitable contribution than a market exchange value (Spash, 2000a).  
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 Unfortunately the interrelationship and role of these three different measures 
is left very unclear, especially with regard to how they might relate to existing value 
theory in economics and numbers used in CBA, and indeed there is some hint that 
they might be incommensurable (Sagoff, 1998: 226). 
Brown, Peterson and Tonn (1995) recommend a process with striking 
similarities but differ from Sagoff in that they do not see DMV as a substitute for 
CVM, because they regard it as distinctly different.  They advocate a values jury as a 
corollary of the US legal jury system, which places individuals in the role of 
representing society not their own interests.  They desire a consensus outcome over 
an aggregate social value.  As in the political process they see the possibility for 
such silent voices as those of future generations to be represented.  The decision 
process is seen as one which should involve “use of common sense” (Brown, 
Peterson and Tonn, 1995: 258), which is interesting in light of post normal science.  
In recognising the need for a new methodology to deal with strong uncertainty, 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) have put forward the concept of post-normal science 
based upon assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete control and a plurality of 
legitimate perspectives.  They regard an extended peer review approach as 
particularly relevant where systems uncertainties or ‘decision stakes’ are high and 
research goals are issue–driven.  The normal scientific approach is regarded as 
having become dominant over all other ways of knowing, e.g., common sense 
experience, inherited skills of living.  Thus, while a jury approach to DMV can call 
upon scientific witnesses and evidence (Brown, Peterson and Tonn, 1995), the 
decision is not to be limited to narrow definitions of rationality which result in 
exclusion of jurors judgments on the basis that they are acting strategically, 
protestors or just violating the accepted constraints of the economic approach. 
16 
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In a theoretical overview Wilson and Howarth (2002) describe “discourse-
based valuation” as leading to better outcomes via formal procedures for achieving 
free and fair deliberation.  They attempt to build a theoretical basis by appealing to 
Rawls and Habermas and define social fairness as “a deliberative forum that: (a) 
protects participants from uncompensated harms; and (b) ensures that participants 
have a common set of rights or capabilities.” (Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 435).  They 
see group behaviour as avoiding negotiation and instead “making consensus-based 
judgments” (Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 432) and “reaching consensus about the 
social value of an ecosystem good or service” (Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 436).  
They note that the public goods character of ecosystems services makes public 
debate appropriate to achieve social equity.  In addition they see a clear need for 
value statements which can be “reported in dollars because these can then be used 
to complement and compare with results from more traditional valuation methods 
used in cost-benefit analysis (i.e. contingent valuation).” (Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 
436).  Indeed they conclude that, while other quantitative and qualitative data may be 
produced, “it will nevertheless be essential that results be articulated in a metric that 
is comparable with conventional ecosystem service valuation techniques such as the 
contingent valuation method.” (Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 440). 
The desire for a consensus money metric seems rather at odds with the claim 
that “ultimate success depends not on unanimity or collective action among all 
citizens, but on the formalization of procedures and conditions for achieving free and 
fair deliberation between them.” p.435  Indeed the recognition that consensus may 
not be forthcoming leads to the recommendation that the process may “need to 
conclude with voting subject to some form of majority rule” (Wilson and Howarth, 
2002: 437).  The appeal to Rawls is used to describe a process which mirrors fair 
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representation as in the “original position”, i.e. a situation in which a person lacks 
knowledge of their social identity, power over resources, and personal psychology.  
This ideal runs into problems because in practice small groups for deliberation are 
selected on the basis of representing vested interests i.e. stakeholders.  As the 
authors themselves recognise (Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 438), trying to value 
complex environmental problems involves grappling with other people’s interests and 
values which challenge one’s own knowledge, value judgments and political 
arguments.  An appeal to the original position does not therefore seem tenable. 
In another theoretical exploration of DMV, Howarth and Wilson (2006) argue 
that deliberation can lead to better more informed choices which have greater 
legitimacy in the democratic process.  They see group values as being negotiated by 
a process involving mutual consent of participants holding equal bargaining power 
(Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 3).  Such a group is recognised as unlikely to focus 
solely on economic efficiency and instead would be expected to introduce concerns 
over fair distribution.  The core of their argument relates to how people holding 
equivalent negotiating power will construct a mutually acceptable group value 
function.  To this end they invoke a consensus seeking rule of operation for group 
decisions and after pursuing some formal game theoretic modelling conclude that 
consent-based deliberative valuation would result in a different WTP and WTA.  
More specifically, compared to the group outcome, additive aggregation under CBA 
will overstate WTP for environmental improvements, and understate WTA for 
environmental degradation.  The clear message is that social WTP as defined by 
groups should be expected to diverge from aggregated individual WTP. 
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CATEGORIES OF VALUE ARISING 
The preceding sections reveal several different ways in which values can be 
expressed in a DMV process.  In economics the focus is upon the individual and 
their preferences which are used to determine an exchange value.  Sagoff (1998) 
has talked of individual’s expressing a social value.  That is an aggregate amount 
they believe society should pay rather than their own individual payment.  If this were 
expressed as the result of a standard survey where the respondent performs little or 
no reflection, and has no group deliberation, the result could be thought of as totally 
speculative.  However, if the outcome is the result of a carefully design small group 
process then we have individual’s expressing their belief in the value society should 
pay or accept.  Individuals are placed in a group setting and then asked to express a 
value as individuals giving what they believe should be the aggregated value.  Note, 
as explained below, this is distinct from a decision made as a group over such 
values. 
Social value under stated preference techniques is normally calculated by 
asking individually focussed valuation questions of respondents, who decided as 
individuals, and then conducting some aggregation procedure (with or without 
weighting, exclusion of protestors and outliers, and discounting).  Yet there is no 
reason to expect this to equate with an already aggregated response and indeed 
there are different ways in which the individual value can itself be obtained.  Under 
standard survey methods respondents are asked to answer more or less cold and 
have, on average, 20 minutes for the entire process.  Under the DMV the whole idea 
is to extend the deliberation so that sessions may run from a few to several hours 
and be repeated over several sessions.  If following a citizen’s jury approach the 
participants would meet for several days.  This raises the possibilities of calling 
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witnesses and achieving the transformative and moral awareness raising of the 
idealised small group political process of deliberation.  Bringing in representation of 
silent voices and issues of fairness then strongly differentiates the process from the 
narrowly defined stated preference approach. 
Yet advocates of DMV, on the basis of theory, go beyond the individual 
expressing values in a group setting and discuss DMV as a means of obtaining 
group values.  Sagoff’s (1998) second WTP category is the expression by the group 
of what they think an individual should pay.  This is a form of fair price set on the 
basis of a group preference.  However, the correspondence of this group value with 
any CBA values is unclear as is how it should be treated or whether it should be 
aggregated.  Wilson and Howarth’s (2002) approach is to use the group to directly 
obtain an aggregated social value.  Brown, Peterson and Tom (1995) also favour a 
group decisions as to what is in society’s best interests.  In both these instances the 
form of group decision process will undoubtedly be important to the outcome. 
These different positions are summarised in Table 1.  The struggle of DMV 
practitioners who wish a better CBA number can be seen as moving between an 
exchange price and a charitable contribution.  Sagoff’s three suggestions described 
in the preceding section can be identified as first expressed social WTP/WTA, 
second a fair price and third a charitable contribution.  The argument of Wilson & 
Howarth (2002), and of Brown, Peterson and Tonn (1995) is clearly for the arbitrated 
social WTP/WTA. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
There is then a clear divergence between stated preference approaches 
aimed at achieving an exchange value at one extreme and group deliberation to 
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achieve an arbitrated social value.  As noted by Brown, Peterson and Tonn (1995: 
259), while both produce monetary values they differ in important respects.  The 
form of decision is group vs. individual.  The outcome is a single value vs. a 
distributed value.  Representation is of societal interests vs. a largely undefined (but 
assumed self interested individual) focus.  Information is open and witnesses may be 
called vs. a tightly focussed closed set of information being presented without 
question.  Issues of fairness may enter group deliberation explicitly along with non-
utilitarian ethical concerns and representation of silent voices. 
FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE 
Following on from these theoretical reflections empirical work has been conducted.  
Studies now exist in all quadrants of Table 1.  Space precludes a full review of the 
empirical literature (see Spash, 2007), but two studies which have appeared in 
Ecological Economics can be briefly presented as examples of the divergence 
appearing in applications.  The first is that of Macmillan et al. (2002) which closely 
follows the economic process model aiming to obtain a more valid exchange value.  
The second is that of Gregory and Wellman (2001) which aims for an expressed 
social WTP. 
Macmillan et al. (2002: 50) conceptualise the valuation process as one where 
individuals “research their underlying preferences, form and then state a WTP 
value”.  DMV is applied to goose conservation in Scotland.  The formal group 
sessions are fairly minimalist consisting of two one hour meetings separate by one 
week for reflection.  The authors are positively concerned to remove any bids based 
upon fairness, describing this as strategic behaviour.  As they state: “participants 
may use additional time and information to calculate a ‘fair’ donation rather than their 
maximum WTP”, and “appropriate checks and protocols to minimise the risk of it 
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occurring are essential” (Macmillan et al., 2002: 57).  Indeed there is a role here for a 
moderator “to be proactive and encourage the discussion along appropriate lines, for 
example by countering any tendencies toward ‘strategising’ but without unduly 
influencing the WTP of participants for the project” (Macmillan et al., 2002: 57).  Of 
course within the context of the neoclassical model and welfare economics the 
authors are correct, they want an exchange value not an attitude or a charitable 
contribution or a fair price.  However, excluding people who want to express such 
values then leads towards a process which diverges strongly from the political 
process model which is meant to be benefiting the approach.  Indeed, as noted in 
Table 1, the social setting of a group with time allowed to reflect upon social context 
would seem to be aimed at encourage charitable giving rather than the self centred 
exchange value of stated preference theory. 
Gregory and Wellman (2001) present a carefully designed and conducted 
study on management options for Tillamook Bay, Oregon.  Critical but controversial 
ecosystem management actions were identified via detailed “value-elicitation 
sessions” held with stakeholders prior to small group stakeholder sessions for 
obtaining social WTP.  The authors chose social WTP for three reasons: they regard 
standard CVM results as producing measures of attitudes not economic value; they 
cite the public good aspect of their case study as likely to lead to charitable 
contributions if a standard WTP question were asked; they believe social WTP better 
reflects opportunity costs i.e. the trade-off with other publicly funded projects.  The 
authors note that a variety of metrics are best with some cases being suited to 
monetary expression but, because this tends to reduce the quality of information, in 
other cases “environmental values were best reported directly in terms of trade-offs 
across options” or in terms of preference ranking.  The monetary value elicitation 
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was achieved by a form of choice experiment giving a stated preference by individual 
participants.  However, the authors emphasise the ability of the small group sessions 
to produce information on distributional consequences, to communicate information 
on complex problems, and that their approach reflects a decision and trade-off focus 
rather than a number focus.  In addition, failure by individuals to complete certain 
valuation tasks could be more clearly linked to controversial aspects of specific 
options, explained and explored.  This more open approach to both the discussions 
and the outcomes is closer to a political process model. 
CONCLUSIONS 
DMV has been advocated as a means by which economic valuation can benefit from 
aspects of a political process model.  Recognising problems with stated preference 
methods economist have sought processes where there is time for reflection, 
potential for information gathering and group deliberation.  This seems to accept that 
preferences are formed during a process aiming to value environmental changes 
and that the type of process is therefore something which needs to be openly 
discussed as a matter of institutional design. 
However, advantages of a political process model are precluded by a closed 
and controlled approach to valuation.  Selecting people randomly to obtain their 
preferences over an object of trade is very different from selecting people to act as 
representatives of society who are empowered to make judgments over what is best 
for society.  In between these extremes lie areas in which lesser or greater emphasis 
is placed upon the individual versus the social context and role.  However, as soon 
as the group setting is established the values expressed will take on an overtly 
political aspect in that the context is that of the group not the individual.  Trying to 
then remove expressions of group values, such as concerns over fairness, appears 
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as a fundamental misunderstanding of the institutions with which economists are 
engaging. 
If DMV is practiced as a formal citizen’s jury, for example, then sessions 
would last all day and be repeated over several days, perhaps separated by weeks.  
Now during these extended sessions the deliberative ideal would suggest that a 
range of moral and value concerns should arise and some transformation of 
preferences would take place.  The extent to which this is allowed to occur actually 
varies in practice because some practitioners wish to avoid the occurrence of 
references to fairness and the possibility of charitable contributions.  They wish to 
constrain the process as much as possible to an economic model while claiming the 
benefits of political deliberation.  Group settings raise issues of social norms and 
these norms may, under deliberation, be key institutions to be negotiated, discussed 
and argued about.  Interaction then is about such norms, ethics and preferences 
rather than just the latter.  There then seems to be something of a conflict between 
the use made of the political process model and the desired result for mainstream 
economists which is stated as achieving improved validity for an exchange value. 
Yet what has been revealed here is that there are possibilities for making 
qualified decisions within a group setting while producing social values which are 
already aggregated.  At present this seems to raise more questions than it answers, 
but does offer institutions desiring monetary values, as part of a package of 
guidance, an alternative to the exchange value approach.  Indeed the use of DMV 
can be seen as offering several different values which are distinct from each other.  
For example, giving a charitable contribution to save whales does not imply that the 
WTP reflects the value of whales, anymore than giving a contribution to prevent 
poverty reflects the value of human life.  Nor does this imply people wish to trade-off 
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whales or people for consumer goods or assume that such things are comparable.  
Similarly an arbitrated social value is very different from an individual’s reflection 
upon what is fair for themselves and others to be charged or compensated.  In using 
DMV economists have landed themselves squarely in the middle of the philosophical 
debate over realms of value and the political debate over representation of different 
values in society.  DMV shows values can be articulated in distinctly different ways 
depending upon the institutional context.  This identifies the realm of standard 
economic value, as being incorporated by ecologists and others, without question, as 
the value of ecosystems and their services, as distinctly narrow both as a theoretical 
construct and a social process. 
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Figure 1.  The Economic Process of Valuation 
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Figure 2.  The Political Process of Valuation 
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Table 1.  DMV and Forms of Value Expression 
 
   
Terms in which Value Specified 
  
Value Provider 
 Individual 
(disaggregated value) 
Social 
(aggregated value) 
 Individual  Exchange Price Speculative Value 
 Individual in a 
Group Setting 
 Charitable 
Contribution 
Expressed Social 
WTP / WTA 
 Group  Fair Price Arbitrated Social 
WTP / WTA 
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